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I. INTRODUCTION

The World Trade Organization's (hereinafter WTO) ultimate purpose in the
international trade regime is to level the frontiers among the trade partner countries by
removing trade barriers in order to secure fair and free opportunities of competition for
the member countries. However, unfair and anti-competitive practices in the domestic
markets can provide a further means of protection in addition to frontier barriers. These
anti-competitive practices in the domestic markets have been regarded as more
important in the service and investment markets than in commodity markets due to their
competition distorting effects.
As the multilateral negotiations under the GATT/WTO system have reduced the
major frontier barriers to international trade, there has been an increasing worldwide
interest in the anti-competitive practices as trade barriers in domestic markets,
particularly in the service and investment markets,
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under the GATT/WTO

mechanism.2 With relation to these practices, Korea and Japan have traditionally been
* Professor of International Trade Law, Pusan National University, Pusan 609-735, Korea. The original version of this paper,
"Anti-Competitive Practices as Trade Barriers used by Korea and Japan: Focusing on Service and Investment Markets", was
published with 16 Bond Law Review 117, 117-65 (2004). This paper has been modified according to the changes of the trade
regulations and measures made by the Korean and Japanese governments during the latest three years. This work was supported by
Pusan National University Research Grant.
1 For the more details, see Jason E. Kearns, International Competition Policy and the GATS: A Proposal to Address Market
Access Limitations in the Distribution Services Sector, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. 285, 293-294, 296, 297 (2001) (stating, for instance,
through the GATS framework, members ... have agreed to maintain appropriate measures to prevent ... from engaging in
anti-competitive practices.) (Emphasis was added by the author).
2 Regarding the continuously emerging character of the new trade barriers, see Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and
Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1997), cited by Kearns, id. at 285.
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targets of criticism from their affected trade partner countries3 due to their manipulation
of

anti-competitive practices to protect their domestic markets, particularly their

service/investment markets, and that the restrictive competitive practices have not been
properly regulated compared to their respective trade volume and market size.
This study compares the anti-competitive practices used by Korea and Japan through
the interpretation of anti-competitive practices under the WTO rules concerned: the
interpretation is generally and implicitly affected by the international competition norms
that have multilaterally been discussed. This comparative study explores the differences
in regulating the anti-competitive practices of Korea and Japan, and implies direction
for the coordination and establishment of common rules to regulate the practices of the
two countries, in the service and investment markets.
It analyzes their anti-competitive practices from the viewpoints of the effect of those
practices on their international trade, considering the growing interest in them
particularly in service markets, and the criticism being concentrated on these two
countries. In this study, the term anti-competitive practices includes private restrictive
business practices and governmental regulations of such practices, which hamper the
flow of trade and fair competition, and have been regarded as trade barriers.

3 For example, Japanese and Korean policies and practices related to market access have usually been discussed in the annual
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. For the more detailed information on this report, see Frederick M.
Abbott, Symposium, Prevention and Settlement of Economic Disputes between Japan and the United States: Incomplete Rules
Systems, System Incompatibilities and Suboptimal Solutions -- Changing the Dynamic of Dispute Settlement and Avoidance in Trade
Relations Between Japan and the United States, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 190 (1999).
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II. INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS

A. Anti-competitive Practices as Trade Barriers

Among the multiple international approaches to regulate unfair and anti-competitive
practices as trade barriers, one approach is to reconcile the conflicts between trade and
competition policy.4 Herewith, trade barrier should be assumed to mean any kind of
entry barrier to the domestic market, which impedes the complete national treatment.
Illustrated through multinational discussions on trade and competition policies, entry
barriers to the domestic market of importing countries are primarily the matter of
competition policy. Entry barriers can also be assumed to be a matter of trade policy
from the viewpoint of the exporting country. In principle, the basic purpose of both
trade and competition policies is the improvement of economic efficiency and
consumer's welfare-level.5 However, while enforcing the two policies, conflicts can
occur when different policies with conflicting priorities are imposed,6 and international
concerns, particularly under the WTO framework, have recently been concentrated on

4 For the relationship between trade laws and competition laws under the GATT/WTO, see Terence P. Stewart, U.S.-JAPAN
Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 736 (1999).
5 Kevin C. Kennedy, Symposium, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium -- Foreign Direct Investment and Competition
Policy at World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 585, 587 (2001).
6 For the potential conflicts between the trade laws and the competition laws in the United States, for example, see William H.
Barringer, Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute Resolution: Lessons Learned from the U.S.-JAPAN Film Dispute, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 459, 462 (1998).
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the competition policy effects in trade policy.7
The main purpose of the international discussions on the effect of competition policy
on international trade, specifically, on the use of anti-competitive practices as trade
barriers,8 is to reduce the disparity among individual country's market, and to secure a
fair and free domestic market structure for access to the domestic market9 under the
precondition that the trade barriers between the frontiers should be eliminated
completely. 10 Thus, anti-competitive practices have been highlighted as a trade
barrier,11 which, if not regulated appropriately, could interrupt access to the domestic
market of imported goods and services for foreign exporters.12
Since the Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization in 1948 failed to
establish international rule regulating restrictive business practices, multilateral or
plurilateral efforts13 have been made in vain14 to regulate anti-competitive business
7 Michael K. Young, Symposium, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Lessons from the Battle Fronts: U.S.-Japan
Trade Wars and Their Impact on the Multilateral Trading System, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 753, 756 (2001).
8 For the difficulty to evaluate the anti-competitive business practices as impediments to market access, see Barringer, supra
note 6, at 477.
9 Mitsuo Matsushita, Symposium, Prevention and Settlement of Economic Disputes between Japan and the United States -Essay, United States-Japan Trade Issues and a Possible Bilateral Antitrust Agreement Between the United States and Japan, 16 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 249, 250 (1999).
10 For the potential agreement on competition policy which is the end of international discussions, Kennedy, supra note 5, at
586.
11 For the difficulty to treat with the anti-competitive practices through the WTO mechanism, see James D. Southwick,
Addressing Market Access Barriers in Japan Through the WTO: A Survey of Typical Japan Market Access Issues and the Possibility
to Address Them Through WTO Dispute Resolution Procedures , 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 923, 925 (2000).
12 For the most visible and well documented instance of such restrictive business practices affecting trade, see Barringer,
supra note 6, at 460.
13 They are the International Trade Organization's (ITO) plan to regulate restrictive business practices in 1948; OECD
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practices. 15 While those attempts 16 have failed, 17 the issue of anti-competitive
practices has been raised in recent years in other GATT/WTO contexts,18'19 and there
has been a general consensus 20 that the interface between trade and competition
policies has become more important.21
Besides the international efforts to address this matter,22 many developed countries
have regulated various kinds of anti-competitive practices through expanding and
guidelines for multinational enterprises in 1976; various attempts by the United Nations to regulate restrictive practices in the 1970
and 1980; a draft of the international antitrust code in 1993. See JOHN H. JACKSON,

ET AL,

LEGAL PROBLEMS

OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1090, 1102 (3d ed. 1995).
14 For the important gaps in the WTO rule system, that is, the absence of minimum rules on the maintenance of competitive
domestic markets, see Abbott, supra note 3, at 185 (1999).
15 For the complexity of the international agreements on competition policy, see Kearns, supra note 1, at 288-90.
16 Besides the above international attempts, there have been bilateral attempts to regulate anti-competitive practices, which,
currently, may be only possible form of agreement. Matsushita, supra note 9, at 251.
17 Attempts to treat with anti-competitive practices and market structures, for example, in Japan, through GATT/WTO
mechanisms have been completely unsuccessful. See Southwick, supra note 11, at 963-64.
18

See

Ministerial

Conference

in

Singapore

in

1996,

available

at

http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm (visited May 11, 2006). And Doha Declaration in 2001,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm (visited May 9, 2006).
19 For the, at least, three WTO agreements speaking directly to the issue of restrictive business practices, see Kearns, supra
note 1, at 294.
20 For the discussions about WTO Agreement on Competition designed to deal with anti-competitive practices, see Brian
Hindly, Competition Law and the WTO: Alternative Structures for Agreement, in FAIR TRADE
FOR

AND

HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITE

FREE TRADE, cited by Jean-Francois Bellis, Anti-competitive Practices and the WTO: The Elusive Search for New World Trade

Rules, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS

IN

HONOR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 365-366 (Marco Bronckers &

Reinhard Quick eds. 2000).
21 For some factors to trigger this consensus, see Kennedy, supra note 5, at 587.
22 For the lack of clarity of the current WTO System to treat with trade disputes on the anti-competitive practices, see Abbott,
supra note 3, at 185; Kearns, supra note 1, at 297.
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applying the concept of fair trade provided in international or individual domestic trade
laws, along with the extraterritorial application of their domestic competition laws23 or
positive comity. 24 For example, according to Section 301(d) of the Trade Act of
1974,25'26 government toleration of private and systematic anti-competitive activities
that effectively restrict access to the foreign markets may be regarded as 'unreasonable'
acts.27 The concept of reasonable or fair trade practice, which exceeds the scope of the
tariff or non-tariff barriers at the frontiers, has become widely accepted basis of securing
fair competition in foreign market.28

B. Regulation of Trade in Services

23 For the cases relating to extraterritorial enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, see JACKSON,

ET AL.,

supra note 13, at

1078-89; Merit E. Janow, Part III: Operation of the WTO Agreements in the Context of Global Commerce and Competition,
Investment and Labor Markets: Panel IIIB: Operation of the WTO Agreements in the Context of Varying Types of National
Regulatory Systems: Public, Private and Hybrid Public/Private Restraints of Trade: What Role for the WTO?, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 977, 978-79 (2000).
24 For the positive comity to substitute the extraterritorial application of the domestic anti-trust laws, see Janow, id. at 979.
25 For the aggressive resent-oriented approach under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, see Barringer, supra note 6, at 460;
Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory Action in the United States and European Union Trade Law: A Comparison of Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1972 and Council Regulation 2641/84, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 41, 41 (1994), cited by Jeffrey Simser, GATS
and Financial Services: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 33, 46 (1996).
26 Regarding the negative effect of the WTO mechanism leading the United States to rely on unilateral measures under
Section 301, see Alan Wm. Wolff, Part III: Operations of the WTO Agreement in the Context of Global Commerce and Competition,
Investment and Labour Markets: Panel IIIC: Operation of the WTO in Context of Overall U.S. Trade Policy Objectives: America's
Ability to Achieve Its Commercial Objectives and the Operation of the WTO, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1013, 1027 (2000).
27 RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 536 (West Pub Co. 1996).
28 For the possible options for solving cases involving such anti-competitive practices, for example, in the United States, see
Peter E. Ehrenhaft & Asil Holdo, Corporate Counsel Committee Briefing on International Antitrust and U.S.- Japan Relations, The
American Society of International Law Newsletter (Sept. 1995) (file-Lexis).
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As countries venture increasingly into one another's service markets, international
efforts to deal with international trade in services also have increased29 culminating30
in the adoption of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).31 Considering
that many service industries are carefully regulated to protect public interest, the GATS
simultaneously regulates trade barriers that distort competition or restrict access to
markets,32 and distinctively, requires legitimate policy objectives to be pursued and
ensures the orderly functioning of markets.33
Consequently, restrictions on service suppliers in specified fields or discrimination
against foreign suppliers are considered as barriers to service trade.34 The regulations
requiring compliance with technical standards or qualification requirements to ensure
29 For the GATS as the result of the first step to internationally regulate the trade in services, see J. Steven Jarreau,
Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the WTO Instruments Relevant to the International Trade of Financial
Services: The Lawyer's Perspective, 25 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 70-71 (1999).
30 Aly K. Abu-Akeel, Definition of Trade in Services under the GATS: Legal Implications, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
189, 189 (1999).
31 General Agreement on Trade in Service, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS

OF THE

URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994)

[hereinafter GATS]. For a full text of agreements resulting from the Uruguay round, see Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS

OF THE

URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1

(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
32 For the purpose of Market Access under the GATS, see JOHN KRAUS, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS: A BUSINESS GUIDE

TO THE

RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 43 (Kluwer Academic Pub 1994) cited by Ruth Ku, A GATT-Analogue Approach to Analyzing the
Consistency of the FCC's Foreign Participation Order with U.S. GATS MFN Comments, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 111,
118 (1999).
33 For the most intractable barriers in services, see Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA and
the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 45 n.27 (1995).
34 See GATS, supra note 31, art. XVII.
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the quality of service and the protection of public interest are considered as necessary
by the countries in question.35 Multilateral negotiations have progressively liberalized
GATS regulations by removing trade barriers in service markets, while not restricting
the individual governments' authority to maintain and develop the necessary regulation
to pursue their national policy objectives.36
Historically international trade has been viewed as involving only the movement of
goods and services across national borders. 37 Trade in services under the GATS,
however, should be much more comprehensive covering transactions which involve
moving the factors of production as well as the services themselves across borders.38
With such an expanded definition of service trade,39 GATS would be relevant to a
wider range of domestic policies, regulations and measures40 than GATT,41 since they
would affect42 the supply of services which traditionally have not been touched upon by
35 See id. art. VI (4).
36 See id. Preamble.
37 For the four levels of the differences between trade in goods and trade in services, see Abu-Akeel, supra note 30, at 189.
38 For the issues concerning the scope of applicability of GATS due to the improper definition of the service activities in
GATS, see id. at 189-90.
39 For the background of all encompassing definition for modes of service supply, see Pierre Sauve, Assessing the General
Agreement in Trade in Services: Half-Full or Half-Empty?, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 125, 128 (1995), cited by Simser, supra note 25, at
49.
40 The term measure covers any action taken by any level of government as well as by non-governmental bodies to which
regulatory powers have been delegated, taking any form; a law, regulation, administrative decision or guideline or even an unwritten
practice. GATS, supra note 31, art. XXVIII.
41 See Ku, supra note 32, at 117.
42 For the use of the term affecting, rather than other terms such as governing, see WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
European Communities-Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/Mex, at 133, 370, 380
(as modified by the Appellate Body Report, adopted Sep. 25, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas] May 22. 1997), cited by Jarreau,
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multilateral trade rules.43'44 Enforcing domestic policy in the treatment of foreigners in
their service activities, 45 for example, could be directly relevant to a country's
obligations under the GATS. Thus, the obligations covered by GATS concerns not only
the treatment of the service but also that of the service business or service supplier,46
which, consequently, regulates the treatment of foreign investors.47
While all GATS provisions are important with regard to ensuring cooperation in
opening service markets, application scopes of them are different from each other,48
which sets the GATS apart from other agreements.49 Thus, all clauses in GATS are
grouped into two clauses: for example, while the most-favored-nation clauses50 is a

supra note 29, at 51-52.
43 Prior to the Uruguay Round, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established
international frameworks (referred to as Codes ) for liberalizing trade in services, however, the OECD Codes did not provide a
comprehensive multilateral agreement to liberalize trade in services. Simser, supra note 25, at 36-37.
44 The domestic regulation of professional activities is the most pertinent example, GATS, supra note 31, art. VI (6).
45 See GATS, id. at

.

46 See Kearns, supra note 1, at 297.
47 GATS, supra note 31, Part I, Scope and Definition: Regulatory Implications. Thus GATS is the first multilateral treaty to
regulate the treatment of foreign inverters.
48 See GATS, supra note 31, Part III.
49 Mara M. Burr, Will the General Agreement on Trade in Services Result in International Standards for Lawyers and Access
to the World Market? 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 667, 673 (1997).
50 For the most-favored nation principle under GATS contemplating a level competitive playing field, see Jarreau, supra note
29, at 63 (Interpreting the EC-Bananas Panel reports, supra note 42); For the negative characteristics of the GATS with relation to
MFN principle in GATS, see Simser, supra note 25, at 50-51 (statig "in GATS, ... Members are permitted to schedule exemptions
from MFN application. The exemptions for MFN, ... , have been described as structural weakness. ... The compromises necessary to
create the agreement were driven by political considerations, not purely by technical trade issues. If the goal of GATS was to create
an all-encompassing principle-based agreement, the GATS might be adjudged a failure.").
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horizontal clause which is to be fulfilled in all sectors, the national treatment clause51 is
vertical, meaning that it is a conditional rule, the application of which depends on
specific commitments52 made by each country.53
In sectors of scheduled specific commitments, all measures of a general application
affecting trade in services are to be administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner.54 This obligation focuses on the manner in which measures are administered
and not on their substance, 55 under which foreign service suppliers shall not be
discriminated against or impeded in their work by the arbitrary or biased administration
of the regulations.56 Thus, the measures should be based on objective and transparent57
criteria such as competence and the ability to supply the service, moreover, they should
not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.58

C. Regulation of Treatment of Foreign Investment

51 GATS, supra note 31, art. XVII.
52 Regarding the developing process of the Schedules of Specific Commitments, see Laurel S. Terry, GATS' Applicability to
Transactional Lawyering and Its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 1004
(2001).
53 See Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception: Does It Exist In GATT and GATS Frameworks? How
Does it Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 281, 299 (1997).
54 GATS, supra note 31, art. VI.
55 For the GATS principles deriving such obligation, see Jarreau, supra note 29, at 66.
56 Article VI(Domestic Regulation) is intended to prevent Members from denying, nullifying, or impairing GATS benefits to
other WTO Members through the use of onerous domestic administrative measures. Jarreau, id.
57 For the transparency obligation under GATS, see GATS, supra note 31, at 64.
58 For this proportionability provision in GATS, see Trachtman, supra note 33, at 88-89.
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Since the Charter for the International Trade Organization (1948) containing
provisions on the treatment of foreign investment failed to be ratified and only its
provisions on commercial policy were incorporated into the GATT(1947),59 the linkage
between trade and investment has attracted little attention in the framework of the
GATT,60 which did not seem compatible to the globalization of modern economy.61
Perhaps the most significant development with respect to investment during the
period before the Uruguay Round62 was a ruling by the GATT in the dispute panel
between the United States and Canada. In Canada Administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act63(FIRA), which was an example of a statutory scheme that
provided for the negotiation of particularized requirements on a case-by-case basis,64 a
GATT dispute settlement panel decided that the local content requirements were
inconsistent with the national treatment obligation of the GATT, but that the export
performance requirements,65 one of the most trade-distorting trade-related investment
59 For the idea of negotiating a Multilateral Investment Treaty, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, Towards a New Treaty Framework
For Direct Foreign Investment, 50 J. Air L. & Com. 969, 1005-09 (1985) (Arguing for a general agreement on direct investment),
cited by Todd S. Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT: Moving Toward a
Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 541, 593 (1994).
60 For the consideration of the foreign direct investment among the GATT members during the period through 1960 to 1981,
see TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), 2056-57 (Aspen Pub. 1995), cited by
Robert H. Edwards Jr. & Simon N. Lester, Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade organization Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 169, 188 (1997).
61 For the necessity to negotiate a multilateral investment treaty under the modern economy, see Shekin, supra note 59, at 579.
62 For the negotiating history for a resolution on International Investment for Economic Development, see STEWART, supra
note 60, at 2056-57, cited by Edwards Jr. & Lester, supra note 60, at 188 n.117-20.
63 For the more detailed information on Canada's FIRA, see Shenkin, supra note 59, at 561-62.
64 Edwards Jr. & Lester, supra note 60, at 186.
65 For the more details regarding these requirements, see JACKSON, ET AL. supra note 13, at 521.
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measures(TRIMs),66 were consistent with GATT obligations.67
The panel decision in the FIRA case was evaluated to ensure that existing obligations
under the GATT were applicable to performance requirements imposed in the context of
investment so far as such requirements involve trade-distorting measures.

68

Simultaneously, the panel's conclusion that export performance requirements were not
covered by the GATT also underscored the limited scope of existing GATT disciplines
with respect to such trade-related performance requirements.69
During the Uruguay Round negotiations concerning trade-related investment
measures,70 strong disagreement among participants was revealed over the coverage
and nature of possible new disciplines. 71 The resulting WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures,72 as a compromise, is essentially limited to the
application of the trade-related investment measures of GATT provisions to national
66 See Edwards Jr. & Lester, supra note 60, at 191-92.
67 For the various forms of TRIMs, see Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, The United States - Latin American
Trade Laws, 21 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 111, 127 (1995); Patrick Low & Arvind Subramania, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An
Unfinished Business?, represented at the Uruguay Round and the Developing Economics, A World Bank Conference, Jan. 26-27, 5
(1995), cited by Paul Civello, The TRIMs Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment Liberalization, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 97,
99 (1999).
68 Sherkin, supra note 59, at 564.
69 Edwards, Jr. & Lester, supra note 60, at 191-92.
70 For the categorized TRIMs for the new agreement by fitting TRIMs into the traffic light categories, see id. at 210-11. This
categorization is similar to Swiss government's proposal, made during the Uruguay Round negotiations, which divided TRIMs into
the same three categories: prohibited, permitted, and actionable. Id. at 211.
71 For the two issues central to the TRIMs negotiations, see STEWART, supra note 60, at 2081, cited by Edwards Jr. & Lester,
supra note 60, at 194, 196.
72 Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 31, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
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treatment73 and quantitative restrictions of imports or exports,74 and does not cover
other measures, such as export performance and the transfer of technology
requirements.75
Since it is based on existing GATT disciplines on trade in goods, the TRIMS
agreement is not concerned with the regulation of service or foreign investment itself.76
Consequently, the imposition of regulations concerning discrimination between
domestic and foreign investors in TRIMs could not be treated multilaterally under the
TRIMs Agreement77 but bilaterally or plurilaterally under the regional agreements.

III. TRADE BARRIERS IN KOREAN MARKET

A. General

73 TRIMs Agreement, id. art. III.
74 Id. art. XI. For the more details about TRIMs Agreement's failure to cover more provisions, see Civello, supra note 67, at
97.
75 For the multilateral Agreement on Investment proposed by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development as
an alternative to inefficient TRIMS, see Civello, supra note 67, at 123.
76 For example, a local content requirement imposed in a nondiscriminatory manner on domestic and foreign enterprises is
inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement because it involves discriminatory treatment of imported products in favor of domestic
products. FIRA Panel Report, cited by Shenkin, supra note 59, at 565.
77 See Shenkin, id. at 566 (stating that the impact of this on foreign investors is that although their interests are directly
affected by TRIMs imposed by host countries on their investments, they have no legal recourse under the TRIMs Agreement; only
goods producers do).
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During the dynamic period of economic growth and development from the 1960s to
the 1990s, the Korean government promoted economic development much more
directly and positively than any other Asian country78 resulting in a greater unevenness
in income growth, prices, trade and in the pattern of structural change.79 During this
time period, the government has maintained a positive role in the management of the
Korean economy,80 and the condensed growth initiated by the government has been
achieved at the cost of retarding development of a national competition policy,81 which
raises the costs of foreign service suppliers or investors to access and do business in the
Korean service market.
In the service market, domestic regulation is more important and serious as the trade
barriers than in commodities market. 82 Despite the Korean government's efforts, 83
Korean laws and regulations related to trade in services as well as to trade in goods have
generally been criticized for lacking specificity84 and transparency85 in the rulemaking

78 See SOON THE DYNAMICS

OF

KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 27-59 (1994) (giving a detailed analysis of Korean

economic development from the 1960s to the 1990s), cited by Eun Sup Lee, Anti Competitive Practices as Trade Barriers used by
Korean and Japan, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW 177, 184-85 (2004).
79 See CHO, id. cited by Lee, supra note 78, at 184-85.
80 See CHO, id. at 178-81 (discussing the roles of the government in Korean economic development), cited by Lee, id.
81 See CHO, id., cited by Lee, id.
82 See GATS, supra note 31, art. VI.
83

See

for

example,

WTO,

Trade

Policy

Review-Korea:

2000

at

9

(2000),

available

at

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp138_e.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006) ("... Korean government has made effects to
improve transparency in trade and investment policies...").
84 See Eun Sup Lee, Safeguard Mechanism in Korea Under the WTO World, 14 THE TRANSNAT'L LAW 323, 355 (2001).
85 See GATS, supra note 31, art. III.
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procedures and in maintaining regulatory systems. 86 Internal office guidance, for
example, developed by relevant government agencies but rarely published 87 gives
direction in the implementation of regulations, and the adequate information about
planned or actual changes to laws and regulations is not available.88 This system gives
governmental officials leeway to exercise wide discretion in applying those laws and
regulations,89 resulting in inconsistency in their application90 and uncertainty in doing
business in Korea.91
Korea maintains restrictions in some service sectors through a negative list, in which
foreign investment is prohibited or severely circumscribed through equity or other
restrictions, which is in line with the GATS spirit and disciplines to allow the member
countries to make scheduled specific commitments.92

B. Non-financial Markets

86 For the detailed criticism raised by the United States, See Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2006 National
Trade

Estimate

Report

on

Foreign

Trade

Barriers

(Korea)

[hereinafter

2006

NTE

(Korea)],

at

412-13,

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file682_9188.pdf

at
(last

visited Oct. 17, 2006).
87 See GATS, supra note 31, art. III.
88 Eun Sup Lee, Anti-competitive Practices as Trade Barriers used by Korea and Japan, presented at Ritsumeikan Asia
Pacific Conference held by Ritmeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan on Nov. 28-29, 2003, 12 (2003).
89 See GATS, supra note 31, art. III.
90 See GATS, id. arts. II, XVII.
91 See 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 413.
92 GATS supra note 31, Part III (Specific Commitments).
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Among the world's 12 largest advertising markets, Korea maintains one of the most
highly restricted markets. 93 Although the Korean government has progressively
implemented some market-oriented measures in recent years,94 some anti-competitive
practices95 have shackled the flexibility of advertisers to respond to their immediate
market needs.96
Regarding the advertising censorship procedures, anti-competitive practices due to
censorship have been reported: 97 advertising materials must be submitted in fully
produced film format rather than as storyboard, which significantly increases the risks
and costs of developing new advertising campaigns and introducing new brands. These
practices may be in breach of the provisions prohibiting the unnecessary restriction to
trade in services98 as well as the provisions affording protection to materials submitted
under the GATS99 and TRIPs;100 products that have been tested and approved in other

93 USTR, 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 407.
94 These measures include the Global Standard system offering advertising airtime in various time-lengths and providing
more purchasing flexibility, Office of the United States Trade Representative 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade

Barriers

(Korea)

[hereinafter

2005

NTE

(Korea)],

at

305,

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file182_7481.pdf

at
(last

visited Oct. 17, 2006).
95 These practices are regulated under the GATS. See GATS, supra note 31, arts. VIII, IX.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. art. VI. 4 (Domestic Regulation).
99 Id. art. III bis (Disclosure of Confidential Information).
100 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 31,
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], art.
39 (Protection of Undisclosed Information).
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countries must be re-tested in Korea, which may be inconsistent with the provisions of
the GATS101 as well as other WTO provisions.102
The Korean film industry's strict screen quota system is considered discouraging to
trade, cinema construction, the expansion of film distribution in Korea, and the overall
competitiveness of the Korean film industry.103 Korea's insistence on keeping its strict
screen quotas has been a topic of dispute in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations,
which, nevertheless, could be approved under the provisions of current GATT104 and
GATS,105 but has been controversial in terms of progressive liberalization.106
Korea restricts foreign activities in the TV sector by limiting monthly broadcasting
time, maintaining annual quotas for foreign broadcast motion pictures and animation, as
well as the restrictions of foreign investment in broadcasting sector,107 which could
become a controversy between the domestic policy objectives108 argued by the Korean

101 GATS, supra note 31, art. VI.
102 For example, see Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 31, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement], art. 6.3.
103 Korea maintains screen quotas on imported motion pictures, requiring that domestic films be shown in each cinema a
minimum number of days per year (currently, 146 days with reductions to 73 days possible if certain criteria are met). 2006 NTE
(Korea), supra note 86, at 407.
104 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-II T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT],
arts. 3, 10, 4. The GATT parties adopted GATT again, with minor changes, as part of the agreement creating the WTO. When it is
necessary to distinguish the two, they are called "GATT 1947" and "GATT 1994". WTO Agreement, supra note 31, art. II:4.
105 GATS, supra note 31, art. XIV(a).
106 Id. art. VI.
107 2006 NTE (Korea), supra note 86, at 408.
108 GATS, supra note 31, Preamble, art. VI.
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government and the national treatment109 claimed by the partner countries.
Korea restricts foreign participation in the cable TV sector through annual quotas,110
which limit market access and the development of Korea's film and animation industries.
The Korean government also restricts foreign ownership of cable television-related
systems,111 program providers, and foreign participation in satellite broadcasts. These
restrictions could basically be in accordance with the frameworks and requirements of
the GATS,112 however, have become controversial with trade partner countries in terms
of progressive liberalization.113
The Korean professional service market has been an important target of trade disputes
with trade partner countries particularly since the financial crisis in 1997.114 Regarding
legal services,115 despite the Korean government's efforts to liberalize the market,116 it

109 See id. art. XVII.
110 See 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 408.
111 Id.
112 See GATS, supra note 31, arts. XIV, XVI.
113 See 2005 NTE(Korea), supra note 94, at 306.
114 See id.
115 The empirical study of the effects of the deregulation of legal services in Great Britain provides some insights into the
potential benefits of terminating a cartel in a legal services market in Korea. See Simon Domberger & Avrom Sherr, The Impact of
Competition on Pricing and Quality of Legal Services, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 41, 41 (1989), cited by Michael J. Chapman & Paul
J. Tauber, Liberalizing International Trade in Legal Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941, 955 (1995).
116 These include the amendment not only of the Lawyer Act to permit foreigners to be licensed to practice law in Korea in
1996, but also of the Regulation in Foreign Investment in 1977 to allow for foreign investment in the legal sector. 2005 NTE(Korea),
supra note 94, at 307.
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has been criticized for not providing for foreign legal consultants,117 thus creating
serious difficulties in working for foreign lawyers118 employed by local firms.119
With regard to the accounting field, Korea restricts the establishment of foreign
accounting firms120 and foreign Certified Public Accountants (herein after CPAs) are
required to fulfill the same requirements as Korean CPAs:121 accounting firms in Korea
are prohibited from making an investment in or providing a debt guarantee to any other
firm in excess of 10 percent of the accounting firm's paid-in-capital.122 These restrictive
requirements justified currently under the GATS provisions 123 are required to be
reviewed from the viewpoints of the productivity and efficiency of Korean accounting
industry, and policy objectives.124 Regarding the engineering industry, although there
are no legal restrictions on foreign engineering services, procuring agencies (national,
local and private) may specify particular conditions on a discretionary basis depending

117 Regarding the reason of the scope of practice restriction to foreign lawyers for protecting the public, see Orlando Flores,
Prospects for Liberalizing the Regulation of Foreign Lawyers Under Gatt And Nafta, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 159, 165 (1996);
John Haley, The New Regulatory Regime for Foreign Lawyers in Japan: An Escape From Freedom, 5 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 14
(1986), cited by Flores, id. at 165 n.49; Richard L. Abel, Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession: Transnational Law
Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 751 (1994).
118 For the shapes of the regulation of foreign lawyers in Korea, see Flores, supra note 117, at 164, 167, 168, 170.
119 For the rationales upon which Korean authority relies to restrict access to foreign attorneys, see Chapman & Tauber, supra
note 115, at 952-53.
120 They include the requirement of a minimum number of Korean-certificated accountants/partners employed. Id.
121

) obtaining Korean certification;

) completing a two-year internship; and

Accountants Association. 2005 NTE(Korea), supra note 94, 306.
122 Id.
123 GATS, supra note 31, art. XVI.
124 See id. art. VI.
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) registering with the Korean Public

on the nature of the project, 125 which may raise the national treatment 126 and
transparency127 issues.
Anti-competitive or unfair trade practices discussed above might be the subjects of
the trade disputes regarding the issue whether they deviated from the spirit of the WTO
provisions concerned and international norms discussed, however, some parts of them
are affected by the social or cultural circumstances specific to Korea. The social and
cultural aspects of those practices or measures are too complicated and controversial to
be justified under the current WTO provisions.

C. Financial Markets

Despite the Korean government's effort to improve the financial market, 128
foreign-based, non-financial organizations in Korea are required to follow burdensome
and costly procedural requirements for financial transactions129 that are incompatible to
Korea's level of development and financial sophistication: virtually all inter-company
transfers are subject to certification, which is a cumbersome, and unnecessary
requirement, particularly for transactions between subsidiaries, 130 which seems to

125 2005 NTE(Korea), supra note 94, at 305.
126 See GATS, supra note 31, art. XVII.
127 See id. art. III.
128 For the details, see 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 409-10.
129 See GATS, supra note 31, art. VI.
130 See 2005 NTE(Korea), supra note 94, at 307.
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reflect the positive policy objectives of the Korean government to regulate the improper
internal transactions particularly of the conglomerates.131 Even though most foreign
exchange and capital account transactions for individuals have been liberalized,132
foreign exchange transactions and derivatives trading by corporations and financial
institutions are still regulated.133
Almost all of restrictions imposed by Korean government on financial market and
foreign exchange transactions seem to reflect Korea's unique domestic situation. These
restrictions are difficult to justify in the face of the policy objectives134 or procedural
requirements 135 provisioned by the GATS. For example, policy decisions on the
complete liberalization of exchange transactions would be required to consider the
political or social situation unique to a peninsula divided into two politically
controversial regimes, besides the economic or legal considerations which are sufficient
for all most of all other countries to take in the same decision making.136 These policies
could desirably be justified under the GATS provisions on policy objectives with
sufficient rationale and evidence. However, it would be difficult to establish the
sufficient rationale and evidence for those restrictions, particularly, without clear
construction rules of the WTO provisions to take into account such particular situations
131 See Eun Sup Lee, Anti-Competitive Practices as Trade Barriers Used by Korea and Japan: Focusing on Service and
Investment Markets, 16 BOND LAW REVIEW 117, 146 (2004).
132

See

Foreign

Exchange

Transactions

Law,

Law

Number

7716

(2005),

http://www.klaw.go.kr/CNT2/Easy/MCNT2EasyLawService.jsp?s_lawmst=72182 (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
133 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 410.
134 GATS, supra note 31, Preamble.
135 Id. art. VI.
136 See id. Preamble, art. VI.
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available

at

of the member countries.
In the insurance industry, which has been the central target of trade disputes with the
United States from the 1980s,137 the regulatory environment for foreign insurance
companies has improved considerably since Korea implemented a series of regulatory
changes following its 1996 OECD accession, a considerable gap remains between
Korea's practices and those found in more developed insurance markets.138
The ambitious restructuring of the Korean insurance industry has been encouraged
since the 1997-98 financial crisis 139 through the newly established Financial
Supervisory Service140 (hereinafter FSS), the Korean government's financial watchdog
and center for financial reform,141 by way of insolvency or implementing workout
programs 142 supervised by the FSC. However, while the insurance companies and
banks are regulated by experienced officials of the FSS the government-run Korea Post
is overseen by the Ministry of Information and Communication which does not have the
137 See Eun Sup Lee, Regulation of Foreign Trade in Korea, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COM. L. 135, 156-58 (1996).
138 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 409.
139 For the Korean financial crisis in 1997, see David Richardson, Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group,
June 29, 1998, Asian Financial Crisis, at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1997-98/98cib23.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
140 The Korean Government: is gradually liberalizing foreign entry into the life and non-life insurance markets; has lifted
some restrictions on partnering with Korean insurance companies and hiring Korean insurance professionals; and has liberalized
insurance appraisals and activities ancillary to the management of insurance and pension funds, since the financial crisis. Office of
the United States Trade Representative, 2004 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Korea) [hereinafter 2004
NTE(Korea)],

at

307-08,

at

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NTE_Report/asset
_upload_file776_4779.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
141 Eun Sup Lee, Regulation of Insurance Contracts in Korea, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1, 5 (2000).
142 A workout program is a voluntary, out of court debt- restructuring framework, which may or may not involve government
supervision.
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same regulatory expertise.143 Unlike private sector insurance companies, which must
follow more stringent regulations prior to introducing new products or in training new
staff, Korea Post enjoys a streamlined, less regulatory ability to introduce new products
and is not subject to the same training and examination insurance sales staff.144
In the banking industry, despite the Korean government's positive efforts at
restructuring since the financial crisis,145 the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter
IMF) and the U.S. government have strongly urged Korea to privatize state-owned
banks, 146 which would allow market forces to more efficiently allocate financial
resources and increase investor confidence in the Korean economy.
Korea has been criticized for continuing to restrict the operations of foreign bank
branches based on branch capital requirements.147 Foreign banks are subject to the
same lending ratios as Korean banks, which require them to allocate a certain share of
their loan portfolios to Korean companies other than the top four chaebol conglomerates
as well as to small and medium enterprises. Although foreign investors may legally
become majority owners of Korean banks, this has proven to be difficult in practice.148
Thus, all banks in Korea suffer from a non-transparent regulatory system and are
particularly required to seek approval before introducing new products and services - an

143 2006 NTE(Koera), supra note 86, at 409.
144 Id.
145 For the more details, see 2005 NTE(Korea), supra note 94, at 308.
146 For more details, see 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 410.
147 These restrictions limit: loans to individual customers; foreign exchange trade; and foreign-bank capital adequacy and
liquidity requirements. 2006 NTE(Korea), id.
148 2006 NTE(Korea), id.
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area where foreign banks are most competitive -, which may be in breach of the GATS
provisions on transparency149 and national treatment.150
In the securities industry, despite the Korean government's liberalization,151 foreign
securities firms in Korea have allegedly encountered some non-prudential152 barriers to
their operations.153
Some trade partner countries insist the Korean government's measures in the financial
sector are anti-competitive.154 The accusation of anti-competition against the Korean
government in the financial sector reveals different priorities: For example, the Korean
government's basic policy has been to give a higher priority to stabilizing the markets,
and to protect public interest, as compared to promoting market mechanisms or efficient
allocation of resources, which is different from other advanced western countries where
market functions are strongly pursued by the governments.155 The Korean government's
positive restrictions to foreign exchange transactions could also show the same
situation.156
The recognition of such differences in policy objectives among the member countries

149 See GATS, supra note 31, art. III.
150 See id. art. XVII.
151 For the Korean government's liberalization measures, see 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 410.
152 For the provision about prudential measures as the prudential curve-out, see WENDY DOBSON & PIERRE JACQUET,
FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE WTO 76 (1998), cited by Jarreau, supra note 29, at 67.
153 For the proper measures created for prudential reasons, see Simser, supra note 25, at 57.
154 See for example, 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 409-10.
155 See Lee, supra note 141, at 34-35.
156 See Lee, supra note 137, at 146.
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may be one rationale for GATS strengthening the importance of domestic regulations in
the service sector, which differs substantially from GATT in the commodity sector.157

D. Investment Markets

The Korean government has been strongly committed to creating a more favorable
investment climate and to facilitating foreign investment since the financial crisis in
1997, but additional steps, including resolution of certain labor market issues, reduction
of labor-management disputes, and improvement of regulatory transparency, are
required to fully achieve this goal.158 The 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act:159
expanded business sectors open to foreign investment; 160 expanded tax incentives;
simplified investment procedures; and established Free Economic Zones.161
The Korean government is required to automatically approve a foreign investor's
notification unless the activity appears on an explicit negative list162 or is related to
157 See GATS, supra note 31, art. VI.
158 See 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 411.
159

Law

No.

5559

(1998)

as

amended

by

Law

No.

7864(2006),

at

http://www.klaw.go.kr/CNT2/Easy/MCNT2EasyLawService.jsp?s_lawmst=73235 (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
160 The Korean government still maintains foreign equity restrictions with respect to investments in various state-owned firms
and many types of media as well as schools and beef wholesales. 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 411.
161 The Free Economic Zones have an extensive range of incentives including tax breaks, tariff-free importation, relaxed
labor rules, and improved living conditions for expatriates in areas such as housing, education, and medical services. 2006
NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 411.
162 This requirement, for example, may be relevant to the spirits of the GATS provisions (Part III, Specific Commitment)
applied to scheduled specific sections in which positive regulations are imposed by negative methods.
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national security, the maintenance of public order or the protection of public health,
morality or safety, which are generally excused under the WTO mechanism.163 Since
1998, foreigners have been permitted to engage in hostile takeovers and may purchase
100 percent of a target company's outstanding stock without consent of its board of
directors. Traditionally, this has been a sore point with trade partner countries
considering the Korean government proclaims an open policy for inward foreign
investment.164
Capital market reforms have eliminated or raised the ceiling in aggregate foreign
equity ownership, on individual foreign ownership and on foreign investment in the
government, corporate and special bond markets, and have liberalized foreign purchases
of short-term financial institutions.165 However, the Korean government still maintains
foreign equity restrictions with respect to investments in various state-owned firms and
many types of media, including cable and satellite television services and channel
operators, as well as schools and beef wholesalers. 166 These restrictions may be
evaluated case by case under the criteria of policy objectives 167 or domestic
regulations 168 provisioned in WTO Agreements without pure investment-specified
provisions.
The Korean government removed restrictions on the direct purchase of land by
163 GATT 1994, supra note 104, art. XX; GATS, supra note 31, art. XIV.
164 See 2005 NTE(Korea), supra note 94, at 309.
165 See 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 411.
166 Id.
167 See GATS, supra note 31, Preamble.
168 See id. art. VI.
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foreigners169 through the 2004 revision of the Alien Land Registration Acquisition
Act.170 Non-Koreans, however, still cannot produce certain agricultural products for
commercial purposes, nor can agriculturally-zoned land be taken out of agricultural
production, which might be regarded as investment barriers to foreigners171 and might
be controversial in relation with policy objectives under the GATS172 considering the
traditional Korean policy in the agricultural sector. While the more liberalized Korean
investment regime has increased foreign investors' interest in Korea, additional changes
are required by the trade partner countries to improve Korea's attractiveness as a
destination for foreign investment.173
Assessing objectively the Korean government's policy for the liberalization and
deregulation of the inward foreign investment market is difficult without internationally
accepted regulatory mechanisms. As for now, the investment environment in Korea
seems anemic to the foreign investors and is not so attractive as the government's
ambitious policy to improve it.174

169 As of August, 2004, foreigners are reported to own 17% of big buildings with more than 11 stories in Seoul. In Asia, the
most attractive property market is reported to be Japan where US dollars 784 billion worth of properties are earmarked for
foreigners. Korea has US dollars 4901 billion worth of properties available for foreign investment. The Korea Times, October 12,
2004, available at http://times.hankooki.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
170 Law No. 7297(2004), available at http://www.klaw.go.kr/CNT2/Easy/MCNT2EasyLawService.jsp?s_lawmst=66247 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2006).
171 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 411. These kinds of regulations are, of course, beyond the application of WTO
provisions while they are not related to the goods trade.
172 See GATS, supra note 31, art. VI.
173 2006 NTE(Korea), supra note 86, at 411.
174 For the gap between the government's policy and the practical environments of the foreign direct investment in Korea, see
Kil Sum Kim, M&A as Violent Gale (Korean), http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/98/981202.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
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IV. TRADE BARRIERS IN JAPANESE MARKET

A. General

For the majority of the post-war era, the principal goal of Japan's economic policy has
been development and stability.175 Free competition has sometimes appeared to be
inimical to that goal. 176 Competition policies in such situations should have been
treated as regulation policies, not as organizing principles for the economy,177 which
has resulted in a regulation-based economy.178 Consequently, Japan's economy today
suffers from over regulation and its concomitant inefficiency, while at the same time
Japanese social and labor conditions are relatively stable, which is different, for
example, from the case of the United States. 179 Albeit Japan recently focused on
deregulations180 responding to internal and external requirements,181 over-regulation in
175 Economic stability has been regarded as presupposing a relatively high level of government intervention in business
planning. See Abbott, supra note 3, at 187.
176 See id.
177 For the relative priorities of competition policy in Japan, see Michael Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in
Japan, OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, 4 (2000), cited by Lee, supra note 131, at 151 n.195.
178 For the criticism against the Japanese competition policy, see Southwick, supra note 11, at 949.
179 Abbott, supra note 3, at 187-88.
180 For the structural reform of the Japanese government, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2006 National
Trade

Estimate

Report

on

Foreign

Trade

Barriers

(Japan)

[hereinafter

2006

NTE

(Japan)],

at

346-52,

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file339_9185.pdf

at
(last

visited Oct. 17, 2006).
181 For the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative operated by the United States and Japan for
bilateral efforts to promote comprehensive deregulation and structural reform in Japan, see id. at 337-38.
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Japan had been seen as continuing to hamper economic growth, raising the cost of doing
business, and impeding imports and foreign investment, particularly in the service
markets.182 Regulations would sometimes aim squarely at the entry of foreign services
to protect the status quo against market entrance 183 stifling entrepreneurship, and
inhibiting risk-taking and innovation.184
As one of the leading markets in the world, the Japanese service and investment
market has traditionally been the core target of trade disputes with other trade partner
countries including the United States, 185 even under the WTO mechanism. 186 The
highly regulated, inefficient system187 in the Japanese distribution markets, for example,
has widely been acknowledged as a significant trade and investment barrier. 188
Distribution issues in Japan have been addressed by the trade partner countries through
basic approaches focusing on: aspects of competition law, deregulation of measures
supporting restrictive distribution structures, and agreements calling upon the Japanese
government to use administrative guidance and moral persuasion to loosen the tight

182 See id. at 368-72 (2006).
183 For the partner countries' concerns about the law enforcement effects of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission relating to
market access, see Lee, supra note 78, at 193 n.110.
184 For the characteristics of the Japanese government regulations or measures, see 2006 NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at
346-49.
185 For the last decade as the least contentious period in U.S.-Japan trade relations in a generation, see Wolff, supra note 26,
at 1024.
186 For the comments on the fitness of the WTO to treat with Japan's special trade barriers, see id. at 1025-26.
187 For the difficult situation of foreign companies in getting access to distribution in Japan, see id. at 927-28.
188 Domination of the distribution system by Japanese producers can create a significant market access problem in many
industries in Japan because of the cost, risk, and difficulty of establishing an alternative distribution network. Id. at 928.
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relationships between Japanese producers and distributors.189 The central issue with
regulatory barriers raised in the disputes is seemingly a bias against new entrants, new
products, and lower prices, which may appear in regulations that are simply too rigid or
vague.190

B. Non-financial Market

With regard to professional services, the ability of foreign firms and individuals to
provide professional services in Japan has been hampered by a complex network of
legal, regulatory and commercial practice barriers.191 In the accounting and auditing
services market, foreign service providers have allegedly faced a series of regulatory
and market access barriers in Japan which impeded their ability to serve this important
market: They include foreign Certified Public Accountants' registration system as
members of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, prohibition of
foreign CPAs' audit activities, prohibition of audit corporations' providing tax-related
services, and other requirements which are burdensome particularly to foreign CPAs.192
Regarding legal services, foreign lawyers have sought greater access to Japan's legal
services market and full freedom to associate with Japanese lawyers (bengoshi) since

189 Id. at 929.
190 Southwick, supra note 11, at 956.
191 See id. at 928, 956.
192 For the more details, see Lee, supra note 137, at 153-54.
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the 1970s. 193 However, strong opposition from the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations (Nichibenren) and a reluctant Japanese bureaucracy has largely thwarted
this objective.194 In Japan, one of the largest legal markets in the world, foreign and
local lawyers face strict regulation.195 Since 1987, Japan has allowed foreign lawyers to
establish offices and advise on matters concerning the law of their home jurisdictions in
Japan as foreign legal consultants, subject to imposed restrictions.196
While Japan has liberalized several restrictions of foreign lawyers, the most critical
structural deficiency in Japan's international legal services sector is that the severe
limitations are imposed on the relationships between Japanese lawyers and registered
foreign legal consultants.197 Foreign lawyers are allowed to form limited partnerships,
called specified joint enterprises (tokutei kyodo kigyo) instead of allowing bengoshi and
foreign lawyers (gaiben) to form partnerships, but they are highly regulated, which does
not provide the framework needed for effective teamwork between bengoshi and
gaiben; nor will further adjustments to that system meet the needs of foreign lawyers in
Japan.198

193 For the substantial pressure from the United States and the EU on Japanese officials to reduce restrictions on foreign
lawyers, see Chapman & Tauber, supra note 115, at 961 n.116.
194 For the cultural concerns to limit foreign lawyers' scope of practice apart from the fear of lack of qualifications, Karen
Dillon, Unfair Trade?, AM. LAW 54 (1994), cited by Flores, supra note 117, at 767.
195 Flores, id. at 124.
196 Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling of Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers. Law no.66 as amended, i.e.
Foreign Lawyers Law. The Law basically conditions the ability of a foreign lawyer to practice in Japan on reciprocal treatment of
Japanese lawyers in the foreign lawyer's home country. Chapman & Tauber, supra note 115, at 961.
197 Out of the industrialized countries, Japan's regulations on foreign lawyers are indicated to be the most stringent and
discriminatory. Chapman & Tauber, id. at 960.
198 See Dillon supra note 194, at 52, cited by Flores, supra note 117, at 169.
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Foreign lawyers are required to follow strict accounting guidelines in order to share
offices, and the joint enterprise can give only limited advice on Japanese law. 199
Japanese lawyers can form partnerships with individual foreign lawyers, but not with a
foreign lawyer's law firm.200 The restrictions on foreign lawyers to employ or form
partnerships with local lawyers severely handicaps a law firm's ability to serve its
clients, and inhibit the growth of international law firms because they force branch
offices to farm out work locally.201 Besides, the required annual residency of 180 days
and the limit to only one office in Japan,202 combined with the high cost of maintaining
an office in Tokyo, effectively keeps most foreign lawyers out of practice in Japan.203
In addition, education, language, and cultural differences have worked to keep
foreign lawyers from establishing a larger presence in Japan. 204 With regard to
determining a legal professionals' form of association, it is advisable to encourage them
to best serve their clients' needs and to establish a legal environment that is conducive to
international business and investment and that supports deregulation and structural

199 Dillon, id. at 55, cited by Flores, id.
200 Id.
201 Bob Rossi, NAFTA Won't Open Doors for Lawyers; Despite Negotiations, Limits on Foreign Law Practices Will Remain,
Legal Times, Oct. 25, 1993, at 8, cited by Flores, id.
202 Keneth S. Kilimnik, Lawyers Abroad: New Rules for Practice in a Global Economy, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269, 323 (1994)
cited by Burr, supra note 49, at 685; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2004 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign

Trade

Barriers

(Japan)

[hereinafter

2004

NTE

(Japan)]

at

256,

at

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NTE_Report/asset
_upload_file860_4776.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
203 Kilimnik, id. cited by Burr, id.
204 Burr, id.

34

reform.205 Thus, it is recommended that foreign lawyers be allowed to hire Japanese
lawyers; to provide advice on so-called third country law (that is, the law of a country
other than the one that is a foreign lawyer's home jurisdiction) on the same basis as
Japanese lawyers; and to establish professional corporations, limited liability
partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability corporations.

206

It has been further

recommended that the Nichibenren and the mandatory local bar associations provide
gaiben with effective opportunities to participate in the development and enforcement
of all laws and rules that affect them.207 After more than 15 years of urging by the
foreign legal community, Japan enacted legislation in 2003 that substantially eliminates
restrictions on the freedom of association between foreign and Japanese lawyers,
effectively permitting partnership and employment relationships between then, 208
which was followed by the new system of Joint Law Firms (Kyodo jigyo) in 2005.209
Many of the anti-competitive practices indicated by the trade partner countries in the
Japanese accounting and legal services markets seem to be established and operated to
maintain the domestic markets, especially when considering the demands from the
Japanese and foreign multinational enterprises' activities in Japanese markets,210 which
is similar to the situation in Korea. There may, however, be specific instances when

205 2006 NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at 351.
206 2004 NTE(Japan), supra note 202, at 221.
207 Id.
208 2006 NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at 351.
209 Id. at 372.
210 The scarcity of qualified lawyers, and accountants needed for, for example, M&A activities is indicated to inhibit FDI to
Japan. 2004 NTE(Japan), supra note 202, at 272.
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such anti-competitive practices are affected by the cultural or social circumstances
peculiar to the two countries.

C. Financial Market

With respect to the insurance industry, Japan's private insurance market211 is the
second largest in the world after that of the United States.212 The Japanese insurance
sector is regulated by the Financial Services Agency (hereinafter FSA),213 which was
established in 1998. The FSA is in charge of all aspects of financial regulation in Japan,
including inspection, supervision, and surveillance of financial activities related to
banking and securities business in addition to insurance, the function of which is similar
to Korea's Financial Supervisory Service214 established after the financial crisis in
1998.215
As the Japanese government has pursued further deregulation and liberalization in
this sector, and despite the noteworthy success in this sector, a number of controversial
issues have been raised by trade partner countries: These include further liberalization

211 The Japanese insurance market is composed of private insurers, a large public sector provider of postal life insurance
products (Kampo), the National Public Health Insurance System, and a web of mutual aid societies (Kyosai), 2006 NTE(Japan),
supra note 180, at 368.
212 Id.
213 The Kampo, the world's largest insurer, and the Kyosai are excluded from regulation by the FSA, which means they enjoy
substantial advantages on competition in Japan's insurance market. For more details, see id. at 368-71.
214 See Lee, supra note 141, at 6.
215 See Lee, supra note 131, at 156.

36

and expansion of the insurance market, as well as the introduction of new products such
as variable annuities and possible expansion of sales of such products by banks.216 The
trade partner countries have required the Japanese government to adopt the policy of
increasing competition as a basic principle of regulatory reform,217 and to provide the
foreign and domestic insurance industry meaningful opportunities to be informed of
comment and exchange views with Japanese officials218 regarding the development or
revision of guidelines or regulations. Such opportunities are provided through such
means as public comment procedures 219 and participation on government advisory
groups.220
The FSA is also required to shorten standard approval periods and to move to a

216 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
(Japan)

[hereinafter

2005

NTE

(Japan)],

at

270,

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file427_7478.pdf

at
(last

visited Oct. 17, 2006).
217 For the motivations for deregulation in Japan from the 1980s to 1990s, from the viewpoints of the trade partner countries,
see Hiroko Yamane, Deregulation and Competition Law Enforcement in Japan: Administratively Guided Competition?, 23 WORLD
COMPETITION 141, 142 (2000).
218 For the bureaucrats' use of the deliberate councils, that is, shingikai to diminish opportunities for open conflict in policy
adjustments, see Ken Duck, Now That The Fog Has Lifted: The Impact Of Japan's Administrative Procedures Law On The
Regulation Of Industry And Market Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1686, 1699-1700 (1996); David Boling, Access to
Government-Held Information in Japan: Citizens' "Right to Know" Bows to the Bureaucracy, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1998).
219 Japan adopted its first government-wide Public Comment Procedures in 1999 to solve the problem that even though public
policy and regulations are made by and instituted through constant interaction with the private sector, few opportunities exist for
interested parties having no special access to the authorities or related councils to have any input into the legislative process. 2006
NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at 348. However, the effectiveness of the regulations has been evaluated to be uncertain. See 2004
NTE(Japan), supra note 202, at 254.
220 2006 NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at 348.
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quicker, less-burdensome file - and - use system for certain insurance products.221
Partner countries are concerned about the policyholder protection corporations, which
are mandatory policyholder protection systems created by Japan in 1998 to provide
capital and management support to insolvent insurers.222 Despite their strong and stable
presence in the Japanese insurance market, foreign insurers continue to have serious
concerns about the transparency and fairness in funding framework.223
Those concerns and practices raised by trade partner countries as trade barriers to
Japanese financial markets are similar to those of Korea: they are in part evaluated as
trade barriers operated intentionally to protect the domestic markets, however,
substantial parts of them are seemingly rooted in consumer-protection or
market-stability oriented policy.

D. Investment Market

Although most direct legal restrictions on FDI have been eliminated, bureaucratic
obstacles remain, including the occasional discriminatory use of bureaucratic
discretion,224 particularly through the use of administrative guidance.225 While Japan's

221 In Japan, for example, life insurance is regulated through control of rate estimation factors, which restrict effective price
competition among insurance companies, which is similar to the case of Korea. In the United States, life insurance is regulated
through indirect rate controls. See Eun Sup Lee, Efficient Regulation of the Insurance Industry to Cope with Global Trends of
Deregulation and Liberalizations, 13 BOND L. REV. 46, 59 (2001).
222 2006 NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at 371.
223 Lee, supra note 131, at 157.
224 For the ability to treat with these types of barriers in Japan through WTO procedures, see Southwick, supra note 11, at
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foreign exchange laws currently require only ex post notification of planned investment
in most cases, a number of sectors (e.g. agriculture, mining, forestry, fisheries), which
have traditionally been the national strategic industries in Japan, still require prior
notification to government ministries.226 More than government-related obstacles,227
however, Japan's low level of inward FDI flows228 reflects the impact of exclusionary
business practices229 and high market entry costs.230
Difficulty in acquiring existing Japanese firms, as well as doubts about whether such
firms, once acquired, can continue normal business patterns with other Japanese
companies231 makes investment access through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) more
difficult in Japan than in other countries.232 Even though the pressure of economic
restructuring and the surge in M&As have weakened, to a certain degree, keiretsu

924-25.
225 For the increasing effectiveness of administrative guidance in Japanese industrial policy, see FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 169 (Cambridge 1987), cited by Ken Duck, supra note 218, at 1703.
226 2004 NTE(Japan), supra note 202, at 221.
227 For the government - related obstacles in Japan from the viewpoints of competition policy and transparency, see Lee,
supra note 78, at 187-92.
228 Despite being the world's second largest economy, Japan continues to have the lowest inward FDI as a proportion of total
output of any major OECD nation. USTR, id. at 372 (2006).
229 For the exclusive business practices in Japan as a crosscutting issue among trade partner countries, see Southwick, supra
note 11, at 974-75.
230 For the private anti-competitive practices that could undermine the benefits of regulatory reform in Japan, see Southwick,
supra note 11, at 956.
231 For the key reasons for the persistence of anti-competitive business practices in Japan to result in these doubts from the
viewpoints of Japanese competition policy and regulation, see 2006 NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at 346-47.
232 Id. at 372-73.
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relationships,233 for example, U.S. investors cite the lack of financial transparency and
disclosure as well as differing management techniques as the obstacles to M&A activity
in Japan.234
Although there have been traditional antipathy toward FDI, Japanese attitudes toward
inward investment have become positive, and some progress has been made through the
introduction of consolidated taxation and revised bankruptcy procedures that make it
easier for corporations and their assets to be accured or merged in a "rescue" format.235
Japan has enacted new and revised legislation providing opportunities for foreign
investors. For example, the Industrial Revitalization Law provides existing firms
undergoing reorganization (both domestic and joint-venture) with tax and credit relief
once the Japanese government approves the firm's business restructuring plan.236 A new
bankruptcy law (the Civil Reconstruction Law) also may provide investment
opportunities as it encourages business reorganization, including spin-offs, rather than
the forced liquidation of assets.237 Other legislative changes now provide for stock
options for employees, a key issue for foreign firms wishing to attract high quality
employees.238 In addition, Japan has prepared legislation on corporate divestiture that

233 For the more detail of the exclusive buyer-supplier relationship, that is, Keiretsu relationships, see Southwick, supra note
11, at 928, cited by Lee, supra note 78, at 192 n.107.
234 2006 NTE(Japan), supra note 180, at 372-73.
235 Id. at 373.
236 2004 NTE(Japan), supra note 202, at 221.
237 Id. at 221-22.
238 Id. at 222.
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will facilitate a company's streamlining efforts.239 New accounting rules are bringing
Japan close to the international standard and to a degree have helped reduce extensive
cross-shareholding among firms, as the new accounting rules identify non-performing
asset and liabilities.240
The practices and barriers to the Japanese investment as cited above are not in step
with Japanese economic development, which might be due to the government's
traditional policy of protecting the domestic market. Some legal or administrative
barriers could be eliminated or reduced easily under the current regulatory or
deregulation reforms if they were enforced. 241 However, some barriers reflecting
Japanese exclusionary business practices or social backgrounds could not be removed
so easily.242 Particularly, the practices reflecting the Japanese exclusionary business
atmosphere seem unique, which are substantially different from those of Korea.243
Additionally many of those practices are difficult to evaluate with regard to the
multilateral norms included in the WTO Agreements 244 without pure investment
regulations, which shall currently be treated bilaterally or plurilaterally with the
concerned partner countries.

239 Id.
240 Id.
241 See Yamane, supra note 217, at 142.
242 See Lee, supra note 78, at 194-95.
243 For the Japanese exclusionary business practices comparatively studied with Korean anti-import biased atmosphere, see
Lee, id.
244 See Southwick, supra note 11, at 925.
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V. REVIEW

The above analysis shows that the trade barriers in the service market of the two
countries have almost identical characteristics, scope, and effectiveness, even though
there are differences in the degree of the criticism against those barriers from their
trading partner countries.245 This may be indicative of each market's economic value to
their partners' foreign markets. For example, anti-competitive practices indicated by the
Japanese trade partner countries in the Japanese service markets including the banking
and insurance sector are very similar to those in the Korean service markets.
These practices reflect the policy objectives of both governments to emphasize
consumer protection or stability of financial institutes rather than the institutes'
competitiveness or operative efficiency, somewhat different from developed western
countries. What is important, however, is that such policy objectives reflect the overall
social and cultural environments of the two countries which stress stability rather than
productivity or efficiency of any institute.
This result seems somewhat different from the study that the author made with
respect to the two countries' commodity markets,246 which revealed that there were
substantial differences between the anti-competitive practices of the two countries'
markets; that is, some Japanese exclusive business practices in commodity markets
were determined to be rooted in the intrinsic Japanese social atmosphere which might
245 There is basic and distinct difference in the practices in a few sectors including distribution industry of the two countries:
an anti-competitive practice in Japanese distribution sector has traditionally been evaluated to be unique to Japan. See id. at 927-28.
246 See Lee, supra note 78, at 177-208 (analyzing the anti-competitive practices of the two countries dividing into those in
domestic markets and those between frontiers).
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not be controlled easily by government policy and is different from that of Korea.247
Substantial parts of service and investment barriers in Japan which are particularly
related to the private markets without policy consideration may also originate from
those exclusionary business practices intrinsic to Japanese markets.
Considering the over-all economic situations of the two countries, including the
level of the development of the service and commodity markets of the two countries,
this result, even though different from the commodity and investment markets, implies
that the service markets are deeply affected by cultural factors as well. As viewed by
international standards, the two countries' cultural backgrounds are almost the same,
which makes their governments' policy objectives for their service market regulations
very similar in their characteristics.248
For example, the Japanese excuse - from the viewpoints of the partner countries-for
preventing foreign lawyers from participating in any type of litigation is that it is
necessary to prevent Japan from becoming a litigious society,249 which seem to be the
same as that of Korea. This excuse may seem ridiculous or unreasonable from the
market viewpoint or profit-centered approach adopted by western countries. In both
countries, however, people have traditionally been very reluctant to stand up in court,
which has sometimes been accepted as a short cut to individual bankruptcy, particularly
in civil cases. People very often deliberately assume economic losses instead of

247 See id. at 194-95.
248 See Flores, supra note 129, at 167 (stating the cultural concerns prompting, maybe, countries to limit foreign lawyers,
scope of practice).
249 Japan Said to Eye Easing Rules on Foreign Lawyers Practicing in Japan, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily, Mar.23, 1994, cited by
Flores, id. at 163.
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bettering their situation through legal action in court. Considering the cultural and social
atmosphere of the two countries, their governments are apt to be persuaded to protect
their legal cultures from other western countries. There are many other situations in both
countries' service markets, which reflect their particular cultural circumstances.
Regarding international regulations on the cultural aspects of trade in service, no
cultural exceptions or provisions per se emerge from the text of GATS. This is in
contrast with the case of GATT, where, even though it is far from being sufficient to
deal with the cultural aspects of trade, there are a few culture-related provisions in the
GATT.250
In the WTO world, basically a rule-based society, the GATS's disagreement on
cultural factors influencing trade in services makes the regulation of service trade by
GATS inefficient and controversial among the member countries with different cultural
and social backgrounds and circumstances. Complementary provisions reflecting the
cultural differences among the member countries are expected to be incorporated into
the GATS in the near future. Until such complementary provisions are made, the
government of both countries should try to establish scientific and concrete evidence to
support those practices that reflect their particular cultural-social environments. Such
evidence could demonstrate the reasonableness and fairness of those factors to
international trade, as well as the necessity to sustain specific public policy objectives,
or the inevitable reflection of the particular situation intrinsic to their countries.
At the same time, it is advisable to establish the interpretation rules of the WTO
250 They are cultural exclusions such as Article XX(f) (protection of national treasures of artistic value), Article XIX
(emergency action on imports of particular products), and Article IV(special provisions to cinematograph films). These exclusions,
however, are not sufficient to consider the specific cultural/social backgrounds of circumstances of the individual member countries.
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Agreement that fully take into account the cultural and social environments unique to
the member countries. 251 These newly established rules would fully consider the
individual countries' specific situations regarding the cultural, social, political, or
historical backgrounds and atmosphere when they apply the WTO rules and regulations
to certain countries.
The establishment of such rules might seem to be contradictory to the spirits
embodied into recent international trade-related regulations toward hard laws as in the
case of the WTO regime from the GATT.252 However, for the practical and efficient
formation of international trade and competition regulations, their uniform
enforceability should properly be mixed with flexibility,253 which, however, should be
complemented with the adoption of strict rules of evidence. Even though it might be
very difficult and complicated to evaluate sufficiently the anti-competitive practices in
the service markets and anti-competitive TRIMs in terms of cultural and social factors
as well as economic and political factors, such an undertaking is recommended in order
to continue to promote international trade in services without serious cultural
contradiction among the member countries under the WTO system.

251 For the lack of specificity regarding cultural products within international trade, see Karsie A. Kish, Protectionism to
Promote Culture: South Korea and Japan, A Case Study, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 153, 161-62 (2001).
252 Hard law refers to a system of norms as to which a relatively high expectation of compliance exists. Abbot, supra note 3,
at 196.
253 Regarding this, it has been suggested: "For example, in the case of the TBT Agreement, taking into account the existence
of legitimate divergences of geographical and other factors between countries the Agreement extends to the members the regulatory
flexibility to reflect the differences between them. There, the degree of flexibility is limited by the requirement that technical
regulations should not become unnecessary obstacles to trade ... These provisions extending flexibility to the application of the TBT
Agreement could be expanded and applied more generally to the construction of the WTO Agreement concerned". Lee, supra note
143, at 163 n.254.
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Along with the incorporation of the aforementioned provisions into GATS and the
establishment of such construction rules, it is also advisable to improve the current
WTO dispute settlement mechanism: One approach to improve the current dispute
settlement mechanism is to establish an independent GATS dispute settlement body
including a panel and an appellate body. The panel and the appellate body would be
constituted of permanent members with the properly-specified qualifications to deal
with the cultural, social, economic and political aspects of the disputes, and appointed
by the WTO through open - competition procedures.254
Hence, the GATS dispute settlement framework would be operated like the well
established domestic-like international court with a two-tier mechanism with reliable
authority, which could provide a more predictable legal environment in coordinated
international service markets. 255 The establishment of such an independent GATS
dispute settlement body would also be helpful to establish clear construction rules of the
provisions of the current WTO Agreements, which take into sufficient consideration the
unique and specific situations of the individual countries.
Another way of stating the situation would be that current dispute settlement
mechanisms under the GATS might not be sufficiently capable to resolve controversial
disputes with respect to trade in services, which were established without sufficient
consideration of the cultural aspects of trade in services.

254 This constitution of panel of GATS dispute settlement body could also decrease the possibility of the United States to rely
on unilateral measures under Section 301. See Wolff, supra note 26, at 1027 (stating "that the panel itself is likely to consist of busy
diplomats with other, more pressing, responsibilities.").
255 For the other soft approach through the non-binding panel to treat the disputes raised from competition policy, see Kearns,
supra note 1, at 313.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Many of the competition and trade-related laws in Japan and Korea, particularly in
the service and investment markets, have been enacted and modified passively due to
the expressed or implied pressure from their trade partner countries and to the
requirements of international organizations like the WTO and OECD. Trade pressures
on both countries in the service and investment fields were particularly serious from the
1980s to the 1990s,256 during which both countries took various measures to open and
liberalize their service markets. Thus, such enactments or modifications were not a
voluntary response by the governments of both countries to internal public and private
sector concerns.
The modifications seem to have occurred in this manner because the two countries'
rapid economic growth and development during the past 40 years were influenced by
their governments' strong export-driven policies (which were not balanced with the
corresponding competition regulations), and their heavy dependence on foreign trade.
However, under the WTO mechanism, both countries' competition and foreign trade
regulations should be improved voluntarily and continuously to implement their plans in
accordance with the liberalized global service and investment market systems, under
which they could pursue their continuing trade policy objectives.
Competition policies or anti-competitive practices as trade barriers, particularly in the
service and investment markets, are substantially affected by the historical, political,

256 For the detailed discussion on the trade friction between Korea and the United States in the field of service industry as
well as the commodity field, see Lee, supra note 137, 155-59.
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cultural257 or social fabrics or environments of the individual countries.258 This makes
it difficult to evaluate competition policy under uniform standards of international
norms as well as to produce internationally accepted uniform norms to regulate
competition-related matters. In consideration of this point, the fact that the
anti-competitive practices of both countries have been comparatively reviewed from the
viewpoint of international trade norms or competition norms that have only been
discussed, but not yet established, without consideration of other external factors limits
the research.
This study is expected to be followed by an interdisciplinary analysis of the
anti-competitive business practices of the two countries to discover effective and
cooperative policy directions for solving the trade and competition-related problems.
Such an analysis could also suggest a direction towards more effective regulation of
trade in services in these coming WTO negotiation rounds.

257 For the Japan's cultural distinctiveness in relation with competition policy, for example, see Tony A. Freyer, Symposium,
Prevention and Settlement of Economic Disputes Between Japan and the United States: Part III: Dispute Avoidance and Dispute
Settlement -- Restrictive Trade Practices And Extra Territorial Application Of Antitrust Legislation in Japanese-American Trade, 16
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 159, 168-69 (1999).
258 For the good faith difference among countries, for example, see Abbott, supra note 3, at 186.
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